

Ballot Box Battles: Sex, Ethnicity and the Electoral Performance of UK candidates

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Abstract:

The UK Parliament has become increasingly diverse from an ethnic and gender perspective in recent years. However, how do ethnic minority and female MPs fare in the polls? Do women and ethnic minority candidates (still) get fewer votes than their counterparts? Are there compound effects for intersectional minority candidates? This paper makes three contributions to the growing literature on the electoral fortunes of minority candidates. First, it focuses on candidate sex, ethnicity and the combination thereof. Second, it focuses on the vote shares of the opponents as minority candidates may not get fewer votes, but their opponents may receive more (see e.g. Stegmaier et al. (2013)). Third, building on findings of a decreasing gender gap in vote shares, we ask how the impact of sex and ethnicity on candidate vote shares changes over time. We answer these questions with candidate-level data covering the 2010 to 2019 elections. We find that women do as well as men, and that the vote shares of ethnic minority candidates are only lower for ethnic minority men (not women). Whilst candidates receive more votes as the number of ethnic minority challengers increases, this effect is cancelled out when the incumbent themselves has ethnic minority status. Finally, any observed differences seem to be disappearing with time.

Introduction

With every election, more women and ethnic minority candidates run for the office of Member of Parliament in the UK. This paper asks how women and ethnic minority candidates fare in these elections. Do they (still) get fewer votes than their male or white counterparts? And what role does the intersection between gender and ethnicity play in the electoral fortunes of candidates?

The inclusion and representation of women and ethnic minority candidates in politics have gained increasing attention in recent years. Understanding the electoral fortunes of women and ethnic minority candidates holds particular importance due to the recognized link between descriptive representation, substantive representation, and the quality of policy outcomes (Celis and Childs 2008; Celis 2012; Mügge, van der Pas, and van de Wardt 2019). Empirical research on the impact of candidate gender and ethnicity on vote choice has yielded mixed findings. While some studies suggest a reduction in the gender-vote gap in recent years, indicating the need for political parties to actively engage in recruiting and advancing more female candidates, other research emphasises the conditional nature of the salience of candidate gender on vote choice. Moreover, the electoral challenges faced by ethnic minority candidates have been found to be influenced by a combination of candidate and voter characteristics, with policy positions related to minority issues often facing greater penalties than the candidate's ethnic background itself.

This study contributes to the growing body of literature on the electoral fortunes of minority candidates, with a specific focus on candidate sex and candidate ethnic minority status. Its first contribution lies in exploring how multiple intersecting identities impact the electoral prospects of women and ethnic minority candidates. By analysing the influence of intersectionality on political dynamics, the research enhances our comprehension of how marginalised candidates navigate electoral landscapes.

Understanding the dynamics between candidate sex, ethnicity, and voter behaviour necessitates an examination of the effect these characteristics have on the minority candidate's opponents, as the presence of women or ethnic minority candidates can

influence the electoral fortunes of their competitors ([see e.g. Stegmaier et al. 2013](#)). Our second contribution lies in studying the effects of sex, race and the combination thereof on challengers.

The third and final contribution of the paper is to see how the effects of candidate sex and ethnicity on their and their challengers electoral fortunes over time. Here our work updates an earlier study published by Kulich et al. ([2014](#)). Using candidate-level data from the BES 2010-2017, combined with data kindly made available by Wolfgang Rüdiger on the characteristics of 2019 candidates, we show that there is no gender gap in candidate vote shares. Women do as well as men. Ethnic minority women also receive similar vote shares to other candidates, but ethnic minority men receive fewer. Whilst candidates receive more votes as the number of ethnic minority challengers increases, this effect is cancelled out when the incumbent themselves has ethnic minority status. For gender there is no effect on opponents at all. Finally, any observed differences seem to be disappearing with time.

The underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities in politics

Candidate gender, sex, and ethnicity are important factors that have been shown to impact voter behaviour in elections. For the past three decades, there has been increasing interest in how these characteristics influence vote choice and electoral outcomes. This literature review synthesises and evaluates the existing research on the relationship between the gender and ethnicity of electoral candidates and voter decision-making.

The electoral fortunes of women and ethnic minority candidates

Several studies have researched the impact of candidate gender and ethnicity on candidate vote share. For example, Sevi et al. (2019) find that the difference in vote shares between male and female candidates in Canada is negligible and the gender gap has decreased over time. Stegmaier et al. (2013) find that parties fielding ethnic minority candidates in the 2010 UK General Election do not necessarily do worse, but that the constituency incumbent party gains votes when facing an ethnic minority challenger. In their archival study focussing on UK

elections between 2001 and 2010 Kulich et al. (2014) find ethnicity-related and gender-related differences in electoral success.

The electoral fortunes of women and ethnic minority candidates are especially important given all that we know about the link between descriptive and substantive representation and quality of policy outcomes. Representatives with shared demographics are better placed to understand and represent specific populations (Pitkin 2020). Meanwhile, substantive representation refers to the idea that elected officials can represent not only the interests of their constituents, but also the interests of broader groups or communities to which they belong (Celis 2012; Celis and Childs 2008). For example, (Celis and Childs 2008; Celis 2012; Mügge, van der Pas, and van de Wardt 2019) find that ethnic minority women are more likely to participate in relevant committees in the Dutch Parliament.

Existing scholarly literature linking descriptive and substantive representation with vote choice emphasises the significance of various candidate characteristics, arguing that some candidate traits boost candidates' electoral prospects because voters prefer someone who "looks like them" as this is a cue that this candidate can also "act for them" (Campbell and Cowley 2014) and will also be more motivated to represent them (Sobolewska, McKee, and Campbell 2018). Yet, in the UK, the focus of our study, after the 2019 General Election only 32% of Parliament are women, still far away from parity. Out of 650 Members of the House of Commons 66 (or 10%) are of ethnic minority backgrounds. However, to accurately reflect the ethnic diversity of the UK population, there would ideally be around 85 ethnic minority MPs.¹ Is the underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities caused by a lack of diversity in candidates *supply*? Or is it because voters do not *demand* diverse candidates?

The *demand* of diverse candidates may be difficult to untangle as the salience of candidate gender on vote choice may be conditional to the salience of attitudes toward descriptive representation (Campbell and Childs 2015; Campbell and Heath 2017). According to Arnessen

¹<https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/sn01156/#:~:text=Following%20the%202019%20General%20Election,Bernie%20Grant%20and%20Keith%20Vaz.>

et al. (2019), women candidates are more likely to be successful in races where they can emphasise their policy positions and qualifications, rather than their gender (Arnesen, Duell, and Johannesson 2019). In the case of ethnic minorities, Martin and Blinder (2021) find that the electoral penalty experienced by ethnic minority candidates is influenced by both candidate and voter characteristics, with policy positions related to minority issues being more penalised than the candidate's ethnic background itself (Martin and Blinder 2021). However, we can expect heterogeneity among voters as the sociodemographic characteristics of a candidate have been found to have limited impact on vote choice conditional to voter's political sophistication (Coffé and von Schoultz 2021).

Thus, sharing characteristics with a candidate does not necessarily lead to vote choice as often it is not clear how or if citizens weigh the benefits for in-group representation against explicit information of candidate's policy preferences (Arnesen, Duell, and Johannesson 2019). There are other characteristics, like a candidate's parental status, occupation and place of residence that may be equally or more valued by voters (Campbell and Cowley 2014, 2018). In the UK, analysis of results of the 2015 General Election show some increase in diversity among candidates and MPs, particularly in terms of gender, but that significant disparities remain in terms of ethnicity and social class (Lamprinakou et al. 2016; Murray 2023). The raised concerns over the under-representation of women and ethnic minorities in politics are intertwined with apprehensions about the rise of career politicians and the professionalisation of politics (Mattozzi and Merlo 2008).

A growing body of literature has emerged focusing on explaining why we observe heterogeneity in voter's support for women and ethnic minority candidates. Research has consistently shown that women candidates face a penalty for their gender in political campaigns. This penalty takes the form of bias, stereotypes, and discrimination, all of which can limit women's chances of success in elections. Gender bias may affect perceptions of women candidates' qualifications (Bauer 2020; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Fox and Lawless (2010) found that women candidates are viewed as less competent and less qualified than male candidates, even when they have identical qualifications and experience. (Cassese et al. 2022) concluded that women candidates face higher levels of scrutiny and are subjected to more negative media coverage than male candidates. This coverage often focuses on women's

appearance, family life, and personal characteristics, rather than their policy positions and qualifications (Van der Pas and Aldering 2020). This negative media coverage can harm women's chances of success in elections and reinforce gender stereotypes.

Parties play a fundamental role in improving the representation of ethnic minorities by increasing the supply of diverse candidates. For a long time, it was argued that the low number of ethnic minority candidates reflected the difficulty that parties had recruiting. But the UK General Election 2010 showed a shift, with Labour and Conservative parties selecting more ethnic minority candidates and fielding them in a more diverse range of seats (Sobolewska 2013).

In Canada, there has been a reduction in the gender-vote gap in recent years, suggesting that political parties are key in increasing the *supply* of more diverse candidates and should actively engage in the recruitment and advancement of more female candidates (Sevi, Arel-Bundock, and Blais 2019). However, it may be that party structures impose a higher threshold for women and ethnic minority representation. Experimental research shows that women candidates face steep gatekeeping barriers in primary elections as co-partisan will rate them less positively than an equally qualified men candidate (Bauer 2020).

In the case of ethnic minority candidates in the UK, one possible reason behind the low numbers of ethnic minority MPs is that ethnic minority candidates are more likely to be selected to stand in risky or challenging constituencies (Kulich, Ryan, and Haslam 2014). There is evidence suggesting that as anti-immigrant sentiment grows, political parties tend to place ethnic minority candidates in less competitive electoral contests (English 2022). It could be contended that stronger measures are needed to encourage the selection of minority candidates as well as a move away from "single-axis" towards "multiple-axis" thinking in order to enhance group representation in British politics, particularly for women and ethnic minorities (Krook and Nugent 2016).

As shown above, studies of candidate gender and ethnicity and electoral outcomes have produced mixed results, highlighting the need for further investigation into the mechanisms underlying gender-based voting patterns. One reason behind this may be that most research

on voter decision-making has analysed single elections, overlooking the changing nature of society. With society becoming more diverse over time and attitudes shifting towards gender, race, and ethnicity constantly evolving, there is increasing interest in how a candidate's sex and ethnicity affects voter behaviour and how the relationship between candidate's characteristics and electorability change from one election to the next. We address this problem by focussing on candidates in four consecutive national elections: the UK General Elections of 2010, 2015, 2017 and 2019.

Another reason why empirical research on the role of candidate's gender and ethnicity on vote choice has been inconclusive may relate to the complex effects of intersectionality. Studies often make the mistake of treating different societal groups as distinct and homogeneous entities, thereby disregarding internal differences (Mügge and Erzeel 2016). However, the idea of intersectionality has emerged as a crucial framework for understanding the complex interplay between various identities, including age, religion, gender, sexuality, ability, nationality, and ethnicity, and how they influence access to elected office and the resulting power wielded by elected officials. We focus here on the intersection of gender and ethnicity and their crucial role in shaping candidate evaluations and voting behaviour and will elaborate on our expectations in the section below.

A third reason behind the lack of consensus among the literature may rely on the fact that candidates do not compete on their own (they are not random observations) and are strategically selected by parties. Candidate's ethnicity, sex and the intersection between them also affect the opponents. There is evidence suggesting that the electorate punishes replacing a white candidate with ethnic minority one (Thrasher et al. 2017). Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets (2013) focus on the question of whether ethnic minority candidates in the 2010 UK general election faced a penalty at the ballot box due to their non-white ethnicity and what effect the ethnicity of the candidate has on the main competitor. Their findings show that when a constituency had a ethnic minority candidate challenging the local incumbent party, the incumbent party typically experienced an increase of at least two percentage points in its vote share. This suggests that all else being equal, the presence of a ethnic minority candidate in the contest tends to benefit the local party that won the seat in the previous election

(Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets 2013). We build on this study by studying the role of challenger and incumbent sex and ethnicity on the electoral fortunes of candidates.

In sum, this paper contributes to the literature by looking at intersectionality, time, and the role of the challengers and incumbents to determine if and how women and ethnic minority candidates are electorally disadvantaged. Using the idea of double jeopardy and multiple advantage (Mügge & Erzeel, 2016), we argue that the compounded effects of intersecting identities play a pivotal role in shaping the electoral prospects of women and ethnic minority candidates. The presence of multiple intersecting identities may result in either electoral advantages or disadvantages, impacting candidates' credibility, support, and voter decision-making. Through a comprehensive analysis of intersectionality's influence on political dynamics, this research aims to deepen our understanding of how marginalised candidates navigate electoral landscapes and seeks to pave the way for a more inclusive and equitable democratic process.

Theory and expectations

Candidates have multiple identities and they do not operate in isolation. Intersectional identities as both women and members of a racial or minority ethnic group may (or may not) lead to an electoral advantage when coupled with the kind of family upbringing, community involvement, and political socialisation experienced by the candidate (Bejarano 2013). Recent research investigating the under-representation of young people in formal politics finds that being young can provide a net electoral advantage to male candidates, while young female candidates appear to be advantaged by their age but penalised by their gender (Belschner 2023). Young female candidates face double barriers or an outgroup advantage in political elections. Stockemer and Sundström (2019) suggest that candidates who are members of more than one outgroup, such as young women, may benefit from an "outgroup advantage" and attract more voter support. In the Netherlands, ethnic minority women were favoured above ethnic minority men because they are perceived as more acceptable to the electorate and less threatening to male dominance in politics. But it remains unclear what will happen when the number of ethnic minority candidates increases (Celis and Erzeel 2013). In the UK, (Martin 2015) examines voting behaviour of ethnic minority individuals in relation to

candidates who share their ethnic background. She finds that individuals of Pakistani origins were more inclined to vote when presented with the option to support a Pakistani candidate from the Labour party. This effect can be attributed to social network influence, with people within their networks attempting to persuade them on how to vote.

Mügge and Erzeel (2016) argue that individuals who belong to only one underrepresented group may face more discrimination than those with multiple intersectional identities, such as ethnic minority women. They propose a framework to analyse the underlying mechanisms that contribute to the inclusion (advantage) or exclusion (disadvantage) of individuals in political representation. Their approach incorporates the concept of double jeopardy or multiple advantage, which refers to the compounded effects of multiple intersecting identities on an individual's position in society. This concept recognizes that individuals who hold privileged identities may experience multiple advantages, while those with marginalised identities may face double jeopardy, experiencing the negative effects of more than one form of marginalisation.

It is undeniable that lack of resources, negative media coverage, and racial and gender biases are important challenges faced by women of colour candidates. However, the analysis of the strategies of successful women of colour candidates show that they can overcome such challenges and ensure electoral success partly because of their capabilities to build coalitions, emphasising their qualifications and experience, and engaging with voters or appealing to their close networks (Shah, Scott, and Gonzalez Juenke 2019; Martin 2015). According to (Fraga and Martinez-Ebers, n.d.), ethnic minority women in the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden have a "multiple identity advantage," meaning that their intersectional identities (e.g. being both a woman and a member of an ethnic minority group) can actually work in their favour by reducing discrimination. (Janssen 2022) finds that Turkish and North African origin candidates in Brussels local elections receive higher shares of preference votes compared to their co-partisans. Her research suggests that North African origin candidates' advantage does not vary according to their ethnic group concentration in the district, but their share of preference votes is higher than their co-partisans when they compete on left and centre-left lists. Meanwhile, Turkish origin candidates are more successful than their co-partisans as their

ethnic group concentration increases, especially when they compete on left and centre-left lists.

Celis and Erzeel (2017) and Celis et al. (2014) use the term "complementarity advantage" to describe how the intersection of gender and ethnicity can create unique advantages for ethnic minority women in politics. For example, it is possible that ethnic minority women may have more opportunities to enter the political process than ethnic minority men due to existing feminist infrastructures that support women's political participation. They may also be perceived as less threatening to the dominant group in power than ethnic minority men, which could make them more appealing candidates for political parties.

Based on previous literature on vote choice and intersectionality, we can hypothesise the following **effects on candidates**:

H1: Women candidates face gender bias and receive fewer votes than men candidate

H2: Ethnic minority candidates face racial bias and receive fewer votes than white candidates

H3a: Double jeopardy: Ethnic minority women candidates receive fewer votes than any other candidate

H3b: Complementary advantage: Ethnic minority women candidates receive more votes than any other candidate

However, as Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets (2013) point out, candidates do not compete in isolation and voters preferences depend on the availability of options. The incumbency advantage is a phenomenon where voters tend to support the party that currently holds the seat. In this case, voters may perceive a minority ethnic challenger as a weaker candidate, prompting them to stick with the familiar incumbent party. Institutional advantages make incumbents particularly attractive to risk-averse individuals, who shy away from uncertainty and embrace choices that provide more certainty (Eckles et al. 2014). This effect may be especially significant in constituencies where the incumbent party won the seat by a narrow margin in the previous election.

Stegmaier, Lewis-Beck, and Smets (2013) acknowledge that the effect of race and ethnicity on electoral outcomes is not straightforward and can vary based on other factors. For instance, the authors suggest that the economic conditions of the constituency and the performance of the incumbent party could play a role in shaping the voters' decision-making calculus. Therefore, it's important to consider multiple factors when analysing the influence of race on incumbents or challengers. Because we don't know much about the effect of challenger sex, we - for now - expect similar effects for sex and ethnicity.

This leads to the following expectations on the **effects on challengers**:

H4: Competing against women candidates increases vote share

H5: Competing against a minority candidate increases vote share

Finally, less explored is how society changes affect preferences for diverse candidates. Attitudes towards women and ethnic minorities change continuously. Views on gender roles continue to become more progressive, and this is particularly true of traditionally conservative groups. Likewise, attitudes towards immigration have improved recently and may continue to improve as younger generations have on average more positive attitudes towards diversity (British Social Attitudes, 2021)

This is reflected in party strategies and patterns of recruitment. While the proportion of women and ethnic minority candidates has been increasing in each election, there is still the question of whether they are nominated to stand in "winnable" seats. In the case of minority ethnic candidates, English (2022) findings suggest that parties play a significant role in shaping the representation outcomes of minority groups by positioning ethnic minority candidates in contests considered less likely to be won, particularly amid rising anti-immigrant sentiment. Mügge (2016) analyses the electoral success of ethnic minority women in nine elections (1986– 2012) in the Netherlands and concludes that their success varies across time and within different groups. The interplay between gender and ethnicity is influenced by factors such as generational dynamics, the birth country of parents, the initial political standing of a group, and the approach of ruling political parties in integrating gender and ethnic diversity in the country. This paper does not address the selection process, but how patterns of representation have changed over time in response to societal changes.

This leads to the following expectations on the **effects of time**:

H6: There is a positive trend in the electoral success of women, ethnic minority and intersectional candidates over time

Data

We test our hypotheses using candidate-level data. For the three elections in 2010, 2015 and 2019 we use data made available by the British Election Studies team. For 2019, we make use of data generously made available by Wolfgang Rüdig as the BES data did not include candidate gender. Candidate characteristics in these datasets are observed, rather than self-reported, meaning that our findings refer to candidate sex rather than gender. Our final dataset includes information on a total of 10,584 candidates across four elections, though for reasons explained in detail below many of the analyses shown will only focus on the period between 2015 and 2019.

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the characteristics of interest to this paper across the four elections for which we have data. The percentage of female candidates has slowly but steadily increased from 25.1% in 2010 to 36.6% in 2019. According to the 2021 census, nearly 20% of UK residents identify as non-white. Meanwhile, the percentage of ethnic minority candidates has increased from 6.9% in 2010 to 9.4% in 2019, with fluctuations in between. This is due to a drop in the percentage of male ethnic minority candidates between 2015 and 2017. Clearly while an upward trend can be observed, both women and ethnic minorities are still underrepresented amongst candidates for UK Parliament.

Table A1 in Appendix A shows the descriptive statistics by party, zooming in specifically on the intersection between sex and ethnicity. Of note is that for 2010 we only have information on the sex and ethnic minority status of candidates for the Conservatives, Labour and the LibDems. For later years all main parties are included. Table A1 shows that Labour is still the party with the highest percentage of ethnic minority candidates. Interestingly, though, in 2019 UKIP and the Brexit party had the highest percentage of ethnic minority male candidates. No female ethnic minority candidates ran for either party.

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

		2010		2015		2017		2019	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Male</i>	White	1319	69.8%	2119	67.6%	1826	64.9%	1595	58.1%
	Ethnic min.	96	5.1%	154	4.9%	130	4.6%	154	5.6%
<i>Female</i>	White	440	23.3%	786	25.1%	792	28.1%	893	32.5%
	Ethnic min.	35	1.9%	75	2.4%	67	2.4%	103	3.8%
Total Male		1415	74.9%	2295	72.6%	1957	69.5%	1752	63.4%
Total Female		475	25.1%	866	27.4%	859	30.5%	1010	36.6%
Total White		1759	93.1%	2905	92.7%	2623	93.0%	2488	90.6%
Total Ethn. min.		131	6.9%	229	7.3%	197	7.0%	257	9.4%
Grand total		1890	100%	3134	100%	2815	100%	2745	100%

Note: The data for 2010 only include Labour, Conservative and LibDem candidates

The models presented in the next section all have the same dependent variable: candidate vote share. The first section of the results section focuses on the role of candidate sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share. In these models the observed sex (1 = female) and ethnic minority status (1 = ethnic minority) of the candidates are the main independent variables. We model intersectionality in two different ways: by focussing on the interaction between sex and ethnic minority status and by running separate analyses for male and female candidates, including ethnic minority status as an explanatory factor.²

The second part of the results section focuses on the role of challengers and incumbents. Here our main independent variables, besides candidate sex, ethnicity and the interaction thereof, are the sex and ethnicity of the incumbent (1 = female/ethnic minority), the number of female/ethnic minority challengers, and the interaction between the two.

Our data includes information on candidates who ran in the 2010 to 2019 election. Technically speaking, these data could be treated as panel data, but unfortunately they do not track the

² Comparing the effects of gender on white vs. ethnic minority candidates is also possible, but yields very uneven and also smaller sample sizes. We have, therefore, chosen to compare male and female candidates and model the effect of ethnicity.

inclusion of the same candidates over time. Therefore, it is important that we control for several factors that also influence the electoral success (in terms of vote shares) of particular candidates. Following Sevi et al. (2019), we include the following control variables: the vote share the candidate's party received in the previous election, whether the candidate runs for the incumbent party, and the distance between the vote share of the candidate and the winner in the previous election. It is important to control for these party and constituency-specific factors because they both affect the supply and demand side of representation. Parties are less likely to put forward minority candidates in marginal constituencies, but voters may also be less likely to vote for minority candidates in these constituencies.

In the models pertaining candidate sex, we also control for the percentage of people employed in a given constituency as a proxy for wealth. This follows the strategy of XXX and the argument that women in wealthier constituencies are more likely to run because they have the resources to do so. In the models focussing on candidate ethnicity, we control for the percentage of the non-white population based on the idea that ethnic minority candidates are more likely to win and run in constituencies with a larger ethnic minority base. Both measures come from the 2011 Census, meaning that they are constants. Together, these variables account for constituency-level variation that needs to be modelled for in order to isolate the effect of candidate sex and ethnicity on their vote shares.

All models presented in the section below are multilevel models where candidates are nested in parties and in election-years. Because we include control variables measured at time $t-1$, we essentially lose information on the 2010 elections because of boundary changes (models with notional 2005 results to follow as this will allow us to keep 2010). We only present the full models including all covariates in the main text. However, models excluding these covariates can be found in the Appendix. In essence they show the same results, which is why we focus on the results of the fully specified theoretical models.

Results

Candidate sex, ethnicity and its intersection

This section answers two questions: Do women and ethnic minority candidates get fewer votes than their counterparts? How does the intersection of candidate sex and ethnicity affect their electoral success?

Table 2 presents three models.³ Model 1 shows that female candidates do not receive fewer (or more) votes than male candidates. In other words, there was no gender gap in the vote share of candidates in the most recent elections. Model 2 focuses on candidate ethnicity. It shows that ethnic minority candidates do receive fewer votes than white candidates. Model 3, which focuses on the interaction between sex and ethnicity, shows that gender is not statistically significant at the conventional level, that the effect of a candidate's ethnic minority status is negative and statistically significant, but also that the interaction of sex and ethnicity is positive and significant. This may seem to suggest that female ethnic minority candidates do better but note that the coefficients for candidate sex and ethnicity are negative. The baseline effects and interaction effects largely seem to cancel each other out.

We investigate the intersection between sex and ethnicity further by running separate models for male and female candidates and modelling the effect of candidate ethnicity. Table 3 displays the results and confirms that there is no effect of ethnicity for female candidates. Instead, it shows that there is a negative effect of ethnicity on vote shares for male candidates.

In sum, the models show there is no gender gap in candidate vote shares. The negative effect of candidate ethnicity is driven by male candidates. There is no ethnicity gap for female candidates. We thus reject H1 that women candidates receive fewer votes. H2, which predicted that ethnic minority candidates receive fewer votes, is only confirmed for male

³ Appendix B shows multiple models for sex, ethnicity and sex*ethnicity, in which control variables are added in stages. Since these models show essentially the same results, we have opted to present only fully specified models in the main text of the paper.

candidates. Neither H3a nor H3b are confirmed as ethnic minority women do not receive more or less, but the same, votes as any other candidate.

Table 2: The effect of candidate sex and ethnic minority status on candidate vote share

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.073 (0.086)		-0.165* (0.089)
Ethnic minority candidate		-0.360** (0.151)	-0.645*** (0.184)
Sex*ethnicity candidate			0.808*** (0.303)
Percentage employed	-0.017** (0.007)		0.010 (0.007)
Percentage non-white population		0.032*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.003)
Vote share party t-1	0.692*** (0.005)	0.685*** (0.005)	0.685*** (0.005)
Incumbent party	2.502*** (0.129)	2.441*** (0.128)	2.431*** (0.128)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.290*** (0.004)	0.295*** (0.004)	0.295*** (0.004)
Constant	14.291*** (1.401)	13.278*** (1.321)	12.711*** (1.401)
N candidates	9927	9904	9899
N years	4	4	4
N party candidates	24	24	24
AIC	55140.32	54876.15	54848.4
BIC	55205.15	54940.95	54934.8
Log.Lik	-27561.16	-27429.07	-27412.2

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table 3: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share by candidate sex

	Male	Female
	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.546*** (0.186)	-0.054 (0.258)
Percentage non-white population	0.025*** (0.003)	0.048*** (0.005)
Vote share party t-1	0.681*** (0.006)	0.687*** (0.009)
Incumbent party	2.333*** (0.155)	2.634*** (0.227)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.294*** (0.005)	0.299*** (0.008)
Constant	1.342*** (0.009)	1.341*** (0.013)
N candidates	6894	3005
N years	4	4
N party candidates	24	24
AIC	38229.5	16735.33
BIC	38291.04	16789.41
Log.Lik	-19105.75	-8358.667

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

The role of incumbents and challengers

The previous section showed that in the most recent UK elections there was no gender gap in terms of the electoral success of candidates in terms of their vote share. An ethnicity gap was only observed for ethnic minority males. Building on the work of Stegmaier et al. (2013) this section focuses on the vote shares of the opponents of minority candidates. This is minority candidates may not get fewer votes, but their opponents may receive more. We also investigate the role of the sex and ethnic minority status of the incumbent.

Table 4: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger sex/ethnicity on candidate vote share

	Model 1	Model 2	Male	Female
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.037 (0.099)			
Percentage employed	-0.007 (0.008)			
Female incumbent	0.013 (0.204)			
No. female challengers	-0.165*** (0.063)			
Female inc. * no. female challengers	-0.024 (0.123)			
Ethnic minority candidate		-0.362** (0.172)	-0.649*** (0.213)	0.112 (0.295)
Percentage non-white population		0.031*** (0.003)	0.024*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.006)
Ethnic min. incumbent		1.184*** (0.326)	1.204*** (0.423)	0.950* (0.521)
No. ethnic min. challengers		0.172* (0.102)	0.127 (0.125)	0.241 (0.179)
Ethnic min. inc. * no. ethnic min. challengers		-0.507** (0.254)	-0.338 (0.329)	-0.720* (0.407)
Vote share party t-1	0.700*** (0.006)	0.690*** (0.006)	0.685*** (0.007)	0.693*** (0.010)
Incumbent party	2.787*** (0.155)	2.671*** (0.154)	2.597*** (0.187)	2.797*** (0.269)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.277*** (0.005)	0.286*** (0.005)	0.283*** (0.006)	0.292*** (0.009)
Constant	13.288*** (1.604)	12.844*** (1.508)	13.008*** (1.492)	12.765*** (1.591)
N candidates	8048	8025	5486	2534
N years	3	3	3	3

N party candidates	21	21	21	21
AIC	44926.9	44664.26	30552.19	14190.65
BIC	45010.82	44748.14	30631.51	14260.7
Log.Lik	-22451.45	-22320.13	-15264.09	-7083.325

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4 shows four models.⁴ In model 1, we investigate the effect of candidate sex, incumbent sex and challenger sex on the electoral success of candidates. As in the previous models, there is no indication of a gender gap in terms of the vote shares that candidates receive. However, the more female challengers, the worse a candidate's vote share will be. This is somewhat unintuitive as extrapolating the work of Stegmaier et al. on ethnicity, H4 predicted that running against women would increase a candidate's vote share. This is not what we find.

Model 2 in Table 4 focuses on the effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger ethnicity on the vote share of candidates. Here we find - again - a negative and significant effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share. When running in a constituency where the incumbent is of ethnic minority origin, a candidate's vote share is higher. The same is true as the number of ethnic minority challengers increases, though in this case the coefficient does not reach statistical significance at the conventional levels. The interaction between incumbent ethnicity and the number of ethnic minority challengers is negative and significant.

We investigate the interaction between sex and ethnicity further by running separate models for male and female candidates and with candidate, incumbent and challenger ethnicity as the independent variables. These models, presented in the final two columns of Table 4, show again that candidate ethnicity does not matter for women, but has a negative impact on the vote share of male candidates. Male candidates do better when the incumbent is of ethnic minority status. The sign of the coefficient is similarly positive for female candidates, but does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. This is also true for the interaction

⁴ Appendix C shows separate models for sex, ethnicity and sex*ethnicity, where we add control variables stepwise. Since the findings are pretty much the same, we only present fully specified models in the main text of the paper.

between the ethnic minority status of the incumbent and the number of ethnic minority challengers for female candidates.

In sum, contrary to H4 running against one or more female candidates decreases a candidates' vote share. In line with H5, running against an ethnic minority incumbent increases one's vote share. Taking into account candidate gender, we see that the positive effect of incumbent ethnic minority status on candidate vote share is only present for men. In other words, when male candidates run in a constituency where the incumbent is an ethnic minority, these male candidates tend to do better.

The effect of time

So far, our findings suggest that there is no gap in the electoral success of male and female candidates. Ethnic minority candidates do do worse, but this effect is driven by ethnic minority male candidates. Female ethnic minority candidates receive just as many votes as white candidates. In this section, we focus on the effect of time. Historically, the presence of a gender and ethnic minority gap in the electoral success of candidates has been shown to exist, but scholars like Sevi (2019) also show that these gaps may be disappearing or have - in fact - disappeared altogether. This may be because of the normalisation hypothesis, which predicts that the more minorities are visible in our parliaments the more voters see them as 'acceptable candidates.

Figure 5 below presents the effects of sex, ethnicity and the interaction between gender and ethnicity on the vote share of candidates for the last three UK General Elections. The coefficients are from models focussing intersecting identities, but focussing on sex and ethnicity yields the same results (see Appendix D). All models include full controls (not shown below). The findings show that the gender gap in candidate vote share has been non-existent in the past three elections. For ethnicity we find a negative and significant effect in 2010, but not in later years. The interaction between sex and ethnicity does not reach statistical significance in any of the last three election years, though the coefficient is positive as it was in the models focussing on all election years simultaneously.

Figure 5: The effect of candidate sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share over time





Figure 6, like the models presented above, investigates intersectionality further by running separate models for male and female candidates while zooming in on the role of candidate ethnicity. Here we see no penalty in terms of vote share for ethnic minority women in any of the three election years, and a weakly negative effect of ethnicity on vote share for ethnic minority men in 2015, but not in later years.

Figure 6: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share over time by sex



Last but not least, we focus on the role of incumbents and challengers over time. Figure 7 shows the effect of challenger and incumbent sex and ethnicity on the vote shares of candidates. In the previous section, we found that the more female challengers, the worse a candidate's vote share is. Looking at this effect over time, we see that the effect of incumbent sex is negative in all years, but only reaches statistical significance in 2019.

In relation to incumbent and challenger ethnicity, the previous finding showed that as the number of ethnic minority challengers increases, so does a candidate's vote share - though not at conventional levels of statistical significance. Figure 7 shows that this positive effect of the number of ethnic minority challengers is present in all years, though again not statistically significant. The ethnicity of the incumbent does play a role. The positive and significant coefficient for 2019 indicates that candidates do better (in terms of their vote share) if the incumbent is of ethnic minority origin. Interactions between the sex and ethnicity of the challengers and incumbents do not yield statistically significant findings in any of the three years under investigation.

Figure 7: The effect of challenger and incumbent sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share over time





Figure 8 zooms in on the findings by running separate models for male and female candidates. It plots the effect of incumbent and challenger sex and ethnicity (and the interactions) by gender for each of the three election years. We find that the sex of the incumbent has a negative effect for male candidates in both 2015 and 2017. This indicates that male candidates receive fewer votes if they run when the incumbent is female. This negative effect disappears in 2019. Female candidates did worse the more female challengers there were in 2019, though only marginally so. Male candidates did marginally better if the incumbent was of ethnic minority status in 2017, but not in the other years. None of the other variables modelled reach statistical significance.

Figure 8: The effect of challenger and incumbent sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share over time by candidate gender



All in all, the findings in this section show that there are very few over-time differences in the effects of challenger and incumbent sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share. Where differences exist these either disappear over time (e.g. in the effect of incumbent sex on the vote share of male and female candidates), or the differences only reach statistical significance in one out of three years (e.g. the effect of the number of female challengers on the vote share of female candidates and the effect of the ethnicity of the incumbent on the

vote share of male candidates). We thus conclude, in line with hypothesis 6, that any existing gender and ethnicity gap is slowly but surely disappearing.

Conclusions

In this article, we conducted an in-depth exploration of the electoral performance of female and ethnic minority candidates in three UK elections. Our aim was to shed light on whether women and ethnic minority candidates experience a vote deficit in comparison to their male or white counterparts. Additionally, we delved into how the interplay between gender and ethnicity affects the electoral outcomes of these candidates.

Our findings revealed that women and minority ethnic women do not face electoral disadvantages. However, ethnicity does exert a negative influence on the electoral performance of ethnic minority men.

We also examined the evolving context in which these candidates compete. We observed a shift in attitudes towards diverse candidates over time, with recent elections displaying a more inclusive stance towards such candidates compared to previous years.

It is important to note that our analysis focuses exclusively on candidates' electoral performance, and we acknowledge that barriers and biases may exist even before the candidacy stage, potentially impacting the selection process. This might explain why we have yet to achieve full descriptive representation of gender and ethnicity within the candidate pool. Nevertheless, it is to celebrate change in society that is reflected on the fact that when women and minority ethnic women run for office, their prospects of winning are notably favourable.

Furthermore, it is possible to suggest that the positive electoral outcomes for women and ethnic minority women may be attributed to their engagement in more intensive, and possibly more expensive, campaigns. This indicates that women and ethnic minorities may

need to exert additional effort to counter prevailing biases among the electorate, highlighting the pivotal role that political parties play in levelling the playing field.

In line with research by Celis and Erzeel (2013), our findings challenge early research that treated efforts to increase the participation of women and ethnic minorities in politics as a unified front against the dominance of white men. Instead, we find that competition arises when multiple groups seek representation, and different barriers may be encountered by women and ethnic minorities within the political landscape.

Moreover, our research unveils an interesting pattern where the profile of incumbents significantly influences the profiles of other candidates. One plausible explanation is that parties tend to favour women in their efforts to diversify, potentially resulting in a gender imbalance among ethnic minority representatives.

The changes observed over time suggest that the training and programs implemented by political parties to encourage women and ethnic minorities to stand for office, as well as the campaign training and support provided, have proven effective. As a recommendation, we propose expanding these initiatives to specifically target and support ethnic minority men interested in pursuing a political career. This is not to diminish the support for women and ethnic minority women but to prevent ethnic minority women from being trapped in a "double jeopardy" scenario and to enhance genuine diversity.

For future research, a more detailed analysis of the additional campaigning workload imposed on minority groups to counter voter biases would be beneficial. Additionally, further research on intersectionality could investigate how ethnic minority women navigate the complex political landscape.

Appendix A - Descriptive statistics by party

Table A1: Descriptive statistics by party

		2010		2015		2017		2019	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
<i>Conservative Party</i>	Ethn. min. male	32	5.1%	44	7%	29	4.6%	45	7.2%
	Ethn. min. female	12	1.9%	18	2.9%	15	2.4%	24	3.8%
<i>Labour Party</i>	Ethnic min. male	32	5.1%	30	4.8%	37	5.9%	34	5.4%
	Ethnic min. female	14	2.2%	23	3.7%	25	4.0%	44	7.0%
<i>Liberal Democrats</i>	Ethnic min. male	32	5.1%	30	4.9%	25	4.0%	31	5.1%
	Ethnic min. female	9	1.4%	17	2.8%	16	2.6%	15	2.5%
<i>Plaid Cymru</i>	Ethnic min. male			1	2.5%	0	0.0%	1	2.8%
	Ethnic min. female			0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
<i>Scottish National Party</i>	Ethnic min. male			0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Ethnic min. female			1	1.7%	2	3.4%	0	0.0%
<i>Green Party</i>	Ethnic min. male			11	2.0%	18	4.0%	13	2.8%
	Ethnic min. female			12	2.2%	8	1.8%	14	3.0%
<i>UKIP</i>	Ethnic min. male			38	6.3%	21	5.6%	4	9.5%
	Ethnic min. female			4	0.7%	1	0.3%	0	0.0%
<i>Brexit Party</i>	Ethnic min. male							26	9.5%
	Ethnic min. female							6	2.2%

Note: The data for 2010 only include Labour, Conservative and LibDem candidates; Percentages refer to candidates per party per year

Appendix B - Full candidate models

Table B1: The effect of candidate sex on candidate vote share

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate		-0.084 (0.268)	-0.067 (0.268)	-0.073 (0.086)
Percentage employed			0.079*** (0.022)	-0.017** (0.007)
Vote share party t-1				0.692*** (0.005)
Incumbent party				2.502*** (0.129)
Distance candidate - winner t-1				0.290*** (0.004)
Constant	21.957*** (3.254)	21.983*** (3.255)	17.168*** (3.523)	14.291*** (1.401)
N candidates	10645	10628	10628	9927
N years	4	4	4	4
N party candidates	25	25	25	24
AIC	83949.89	83834.51	83823.83	55140.32
BIC	83978.98	83870.87	83867.46	55205.15
Log.Lik	-41970.95	-41912.26	-41905.916	-27561.16

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table B2: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate		-1.379*** (0.454)	-1.978*** (0.473)	-0.360** (0.151)
Percentage non-white			0.037*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.003)
Vote share party t-1				0.685*** (0.005)
Incumbent party				2.441*** (0.128)
Distance candidate - winner t-1				0.295*** (0.004)
Constant	21.957*** (3.254)	22.059*** (3.254)	21.704*** (3.264)	13.278*** (1.321)
N candidates	10645	10589	10589	9904
N years	4	4	4	4
N party candidates	25	25	25	24
AIC	83949.89	83538.64	83520.68	54876.15
BIC	83978.98	83574.98	83564.29	54940.95
Log.Lik	-41970.95	-41764.32	-41754.34	-27429.07

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table B3: The effect of candidate sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate		-0.054 (0.268)	-0.409 (0.279)	-0.433 (0.279)	-0.165* (0.089)
Ethnic minority candidate		-1.378*** (0.454)	-2.858*** (0.558)	-3.542*** (0.573)	-0.645*** (0.184)
Sex*ethnicity candidate			4.354*** (0.955)	4.319*** (0.953)	0.808*** (0.303)
Percentage employed				0.114*** (0.023)	0.010 (0.007)
Percentage non-white population				0.050*** (0.009)	0.033*** (0.003)
Vote share party t-1					0.685*** (0.005)
Incumbent party					2.431*** (0.128)
Distance candidate - winner t-1					0.295*** (0.004)
Constant	21.957*** (3.254)	22.076*** (3.255)	22.185*** (3.252)	14.724*** (3.570)	12.711** *
N candidates	10645	10584	10584	10584	9899
N years	4	4	4	4	4
N party candidates	25	25	25	25	24
AIC	83949.89	83505.87	83487.11	83447.1	54848.4

BIC	83978.98	83549.47	83537.98	83512.51	54934.8
Log.Lik	-41970.95	-41746.93	-41736.56	-41714.55	-27412.2

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix C - Full challenger and incumbent models

Table C1: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger sex on candidate vote share

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.073 (0.086)	-0.035 (0.098)	-0.037 (0.099)
Percentage employed	-0.017** (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)
Vote share party t-1	0.692*** (0.005)	0.701*** (0.006)	0.700*** (0.006)
Incumbent party	2.502*** (0.129)	2.787*** (0.155)	2.787*** (0.155)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.290*** (0.004)	0.277*** (0.005)	0.277*** (0.005)
Female incumbent		-0.021 (0.107)	0.013 (0.204)
No. female challengers		-0.171*** (0.054)	-0.165*** (0.063)
Female inc. * no. female challengers			-0.024 (0.123)
Constant	14.291*** (1.401)	13.295*** (1.603)	13.288*** (1.604)
N candidates	9927	8048	8048
N years	4	3	3
N party candidates	24	21	21

AIC	55140.32	44924.94	44926.9
BIC	55205.15	45001.86	45010.82
Log.Lik	-27561.16	-22451.47	-22451.45

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table C2: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger ethnicity on candidate vote share

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.360** (0.151)	-0.321* (0.171)	-0.362** (0.172)
Percentage non-white population	0.032*** (0.003)	0.030*** (0.003)	0.031*** (0.003)
Vote share party t-1	0.685*** (0.005)	0.690*** (0.006)	0.690*** (0.006)
Incumbent party	2.441*** (0.128)	2.673*** (0.154)	2.671*** (0.154)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.295*** (0.004)	0.286*** (0.005)	0.286*** (0.005)
Ethnic min. incumbent		0.677*** (0.203)	1.184*** (0.326)
No. ethnic min. challengers		0.105 (0.097)	0.172* (0.102)
Ethnic min. inc. * no. ethnic min. challengers			-0.507** (0.254)
Constant	13.278***	12.861***	12.844***

	(1.321)	(1.507)	(1.508)
N candidates	9904	8025	8025
N years	4	3	3
N party candidates	24	21	21
AIC	54876.15	44666.24	44664.26
BIC	54940.95	44743.13	44748.14
Log.Lik	-27429.07	-22322.12	-22320.13

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table C3: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share

	Male b/(se)	Female b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.649*** (0.213)	0.112 (0.295)
Percentage non-white population	0.024*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.006)
Vote share party t-1	0.685*** (0.007)	0.693*** (0.010)
Incumbent party	2.597*** (0.187)	2.797*** (0.269)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.283*** (0.006)	0.292*** (0.009)
Ethnic min. incumbent	1.204*** (0.423)	0.950* (0.521)

No. ethnic min. challengers	0.127	0.241
	(0.125)	(0.179)
Ethnic min. inc. * no. ethnic min. challengers	-0.338	-0.720*
	(0.329)	(0.407)
Constant	13.008***	12.765***
	(1.492)	(1.591)
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N candidates	5486	2534
N years	3	3
N party candidates	21	21
AIC	30552.19	14190.65
BIC	30631.51	14260.7
Log.Lik	-15264.09	-7083.325
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Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Appendix D - Full time models candidates

Table D1: The effect of candidate sex on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.159 (0.122)	-0.077 (0.177)	0.030 (0.154)	-0.014 (0.155)
Percentage employed	-0.028*** (0.010)	0.039*** (0.014)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.004 (0.014)
Vote share party t-1	0.432*** (0.006)	0.592*** (0.010)	0.674*** (0.010)	0.833*** (0.009)
Incumbent party	2.831*** (0.181)	2.233*** (0.244)	2.397*** (0.277)	3.019*** (0.280)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.498*** (0.005)	0.374*** (0.009)	0.279*** (0.008)	0.177*** (0.008)
Year	0.401*** (0.019)			
Constant	- 782.464*** (38.297)	16.721*** (3.346)	11.346*** (2.253)	7.422*** (1.668)
N candidates	9927	2855	2799	2394
N party candidates	7	7	7	7
AIC	62041.36	16237.09	15297.71	12983.2
BIC	62106.19	16284.75	15345.2	13029.45
Log.Lik	-31011.68	-8110.545	-7640.854	-6483.602

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table D2: The effect of candidate sex on candidate vote share over time




Table D3: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.148 (0.215)	-0.504* (0.302)	-0.010 (0.282)	-0.242 (0.264)
Percentage non-white	0.047*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.049*** (0.005)
Vote share party t-1	0.427*** (0.006)	0.594*** (0.010)	0.665*** (0.010)	0.808*** (0.009)
Incumbent party	2.733*** (0.179)	2.237*** (0.244)	2.382*** (0.276)	3.037*** (0.274)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.503*** (0.005)	0.371*** (0.009)	0.288*** (0.008)	0.202*** (0.008)
Year	0.404*** (0.019)			
Constant	- 790.700*** (37.856)	18.863*** (3.266)	11.503*** (2.084)	7.977*** (1.343)
N candidates	9904	2834	2804	2387
N party candidates	7	7	7	7
AIC	61729.57	16121.42	15297.02	12861.31
BIC	61794.38	16169.02	15344.53	12907.53
Log.Lik	-30855.79	-8052.712	-7640.512	-6422.653

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Figure D4: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share over time




Table D5: The effect of candidate sex and ethnicity on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.266** (0.127)	-0.169 (0.185)	-0.044 (0.159)	-0.107 (0.160)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.415 (0.261)	-0.853** (0.362)	-0.235 (0.344)	-0.471 (0.338)
Sex*ethnicity candidate	0.758* (0.431)	1.019* (0.617)	0.596 (0.574)	0.464 (0.507)
Percentage employed	0.012 (0.011)	0.058*** (0.015)	0.021 (0.013)	0.030** (0.014)
Percentage non-white population	0.049*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.026*** (0.005)	0.052*** (0.006)
Vote share party t-1	0.426*** (0.006)	0.590*** (0.010)	0.663*** (0.010)	0.810*** (0.009)
Incumbent party	2.720*** (0.180)	2.135*** (0.245)	2.378*** (0.276)	2.983*** (0.275)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.503*** (0.005)	0.374*** (0.009)	0.288*** (0.008)	0.200*** (0.008)
Year	0.407*** (0.019)			
Constant	- 796.891*** (38.014)	15.514*** (3.370)	10.267*** (2.226)	6.116*** (1.635)
N candidates	9899	2834	2799	2387
N party candidates	7	7	7	7

AIC	61700.71	16109.33	15276.43	12861.99
BIC	61787.12	16174.77	15341.73	12925.55
Log.Lik	-30838.36	-8043.665	-7627.213	-6419.995

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table D6: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share over time for male candidates

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.264 (0.265)	-0.683* (0.366)	-0.277 (0.342)	-0.379 (0.347)
Percentage non-white	0.037*** (0.005)	0.004 (0.006)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.042*** (0.007)
Vote share party t-1	0.421*** (0.007)	0.599*** (0.012)	0.673*** (0.011)	0.809*** (0.012)
Incumbent party	2.728*** (0.218)	2.406*** (0.284)	2.036*** (0.338)	2.748*** (0.360)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.505*** (0.006)	0.371*** (0.010)	0.265*** (0.010)	0.196*** (0.010)
Year	0.387*** (0.023)			
Constant	- 755.117*** (45.384)	18.654*** (3.185)	10.977*** (2.199)	8.093*** (1.399)
N candidates	6894	2069	1945	1472
N party candidates	7	7	7	7

AIC	42997.49	11760.12	10554.18	7986.02
BIC	43059.03	11805.19	10598.77	8028.38
Log.Lik	-21489.74	-5872.058	-5269.091	-3985.01

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table D7: The effect of candidate ethnicity on candidate vote share over time for female candidates

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	0.018 (0.365)	-0.126 (0.534)	0.433 (0.497)	-0.103 (0.409)
Percentage non-white	0.069*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.024*** (0.009)	0.058*** (0.009)
Vote share party t-1	0.438*** (0.010)	0.573*** (0.021)	0.638*** (0.019)	0.800*** (0.014)
Incumbent party	2.660*** (0.316)	1.731*** (0.475)	2.960*** (0.477)	3.440*** (0.423)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.499*** (0.009)	0.377*** (0.017)	0.333*** (0.015)	0.213*** (0.013)
Year	0.463*** (0.035)			
Constant	- 908.989*** (69.837)	19.583*** (3.462)	12.954** * (2.006)	8.123*** (1.441)
N candidates	3005	765	854	915
N party candidates	7	7	7	7

AIC	18717.2	4399.03	4737.824	4912.591
BIC	18771.27	4436.149	4775.82	4951.14
Log.Lik	-9349.601	-2191.515	-2360.91	-2448.296

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix E - Full time models challengers

Table E1: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger sex on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.257*	-0.040	0.104	-0.078
	(0.140)	(0.182)	(0.158)	(0.159)
Percentage employed	-0.014	0.036**	-0.005	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Vote share party t-1	0.393***	0.590***	0.674***	0.831***
	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Incumbent party	2.840***	2.223***	2.434***	3.078***
	(0.217)	(0.244)	(0.278)	(0.280)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.510***	0.376***	0.280***	0.179***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female incumbent	-0.077	-0.251	-0.525*	0.222
	(0.289)	(0.402)	(0.317)	(0.323)
No. female challengers	-0.292***	-0.180*	-0.061	-0.330***
	(0.089)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.114)
Female inc. * no. female challengers	0.033	-0.005	0.171	0.033
	(0.174)	(0.232)	(0.197)	(0.199)
Year	1.120***			
	(0.041)			
Constant	-2232.504***	17.256***	11.674***	7.781***
	(83.408)	(3.340)	(2.254)	(1.676)
N candidates	8048	2855	2799	2394

N party candidates	7	7	7	7
AIC	50473.09	16235.31	15299.28	12977.48
BIC	50557.01	16300.84	15364.59	13041.07
Log.Lik	-25224.55	-8106.657	-7638.64	-6477.739

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table E2: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger ethnicity on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.324 (0.243)	-0.644** (0.309)	-0.108 (0.291)	-0.435 (0.274)
Percentage non-white population	0.052*** (0.005)	0.010* (0.006)	0.021*** (0.005)	0.046*** (0.006)
Vote share party t-1	0.383*** (0.006)	0.593*** (0.010)	0.664*** (0.010)	0.807*** (0.009)
Incumbent party	2.627*** (0.215)	2.207*** (0.244)	2.362*** (0.276)	3.017*** (0.274)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.520*** (0.006)	0.372*** (0.009)	0.288*** (0.008)	0.203*** (0.008)
Female incumbent	1.871*** (0.460)	1.313* (0.753)	0.615 (0.488)	1.241** (0.489)
No. female challengers	0.293** (0.145)	0.265 (0.164)	0.075 (0.179)	0.125 (0.180)
Female inc. * no. female challengers	-0.637* (0.359)	-0.497 (0.494)	-0.120 (0.395)	-0.469 (0.431)

Year	1.123***			
	(0.041)			
Constant	-2239.127***	18.904***	11.553***	8.027***
	(82.322)	(3.260)	(2.082)	(1.340)
N candidates	8025	2834	2804	2387
N party candidates	7	7	7	7
AIC	50110.65	16119.97	15299.47	12857.04
BIC	50194.53	16185.42	15364.79	12920.6
Log.Lik	-25043.32	-8048.987	-7638.734	-6417.52

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<.01

Table E2: The effect of candidate, incumbent and challenger gender and ethnicity on candidate vote share over time

	Year FE	2015	2017	2019
	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)	b/(se)
Female candidate	-0.373***	-0.135	0.042	-0.150
	(0.143)	(0.189)	(0.163)	(0.163)
Ethnic minority candidate	-0.664**	-0.994***	-0.325	-0.635*
	(0.295)	(0.366)	(0.348)	(0.343)
Sex*ethnicity candidate	0.907*	0.983	0.578	0.450
	(0.471)	(0.617)	(0.580)	(0.505)
Percentage employed	0.037***	0.056***	0.016	0.027*
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.014)
Percentage non-white population	0.059***	0.019***	0.024***	0.050***
	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Vote share party t-1	0.381***	0.586***	0.662***	0.805***

	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Incumbent party	2.575***	2.089***	2.400***	3.019***
	(0.215)	(0.245)	(0.277)	(0.275)
Distance candidate - winner t-1	0.520***	0.377***	0.291***	0.203***
	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female incumbent	-0.103	-0.192	-0.539*	0.106
	(0.286)	(0.403)	(0.316)	(0.318)
No. female challengers	-0.304***	-0.194*	-0.066	-0.362***
	(0.088)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.112)
Ethnic min. incumbent	-0.077	-0.074	0.122	0.034
	(0.172)	(0.232)	(0.196)	(0.195)
No. ethnic min. challengers	1.848***	1.507**	0.671	1.120**
	(0.462)	(0.753)	(0.496)	(0.489)
Female inc. * no. female challengers	0.303**	0.265	0.065	0.139
	(0.145)	(0.164)	(0.179)	(0.181)
Ethnic min. inc. * no. ethnic min. challengers	-0.646*	-0.572	-0.119	-0.510
	(0.360)	(0.494)	(0.399)	(0.431)
Year	1.145***			
	(0.041)			
Constant	-	16.063***	10.790***	6.874***
	2284.779***			
	(82.596)	(3.358)	(2.223)	(1.645)
N candidates	8020	2834	2799	2387
N party candidates	7	7	7	7
AIC	50046.91	16103.48	15278.4	12850.39
BIC	50172.72	16204.63	15379.33	12948.61

Log.Lik

-25005.45 -8034.742 -7622.202 -6408.194

Note: b coefficients from multilevel models; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *p<.01**

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